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Informally Connected: New Institutionalist 
Explanations for Participation in Informal 
Networks 
Peer Scheepers, Tom Van der Meer and Manfred Te Grotenhuis 
In recent years, attention for social participation as an aspect of social capital has 
been on the rise (Stolle/Hooghe 2005). The extent to which individuals socialize 
with friends, neighbours or colleagues informally in the intimate sphere is what we 
label social participation. Social participation may be characterized in terms of 
quantity, i.e., frequency of contact, and quality, i.e., content of contact (c.f. Mangen 
et al. 1988). Social participation has profound effects on participation in the broader 
public sphere (Halpern 2005) as it provides instrumental and expressive benefits 
(Lin 2001; Moerbeek 2001).  
Several authors actually propose that states and their institutions are important 
determinants of social participation (Levi 1996; Tarrow 1996; Onyx/Bullen 2001; 
Szreter 2002). However, little empirical research has been done to test the impact of 
state institutions on various forms of participation (Parboteeah et al.; Freitag 2006). 
Consequently, no more than a handful of comparative studies (e.g. Scheepers et al. 
2002; Van Oorschot/Arts 2005) have looked at the association between state 
institutions and social participation.  
We set out to answer the following questions: (1) to what extent do the levels of 
social participation differ cross-nationally? (2) to what extent do state institutions 
determine social participation, taking individual characteristics into account? (3) to 
what extent is the impact of state institutions on social participation similar across 
social categories? 
This article contributes to the literature on social participation in three ways. 
First, we derive and test hypotheses following three lines of reasoning providing us 
with contradictory and complementary views. Second, this article takes a range of 
state institutions into account, whereas other research has limited itself to one such 
institution, most notably the welfare state. Third, we make a strict distinction 
between the quantity and the quality of social participation.  
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Hypotheses: Crowding out 
The ›traditional‹ line of reasoning emphasizes the material incentives of social parti-
cipation: social participation results from extensive considerations of costs and 
benefits. Social participation is not a goal in itself, but a means to fulfil a higher 
(economic) need (Flap 1999). To compensate for a lack of economic capital, people 
invest in their informal network ties to construct an economic safety net. Yet, this 
individual level hypothesis is not often corroborated by previous findings: generally, 
a positive relation is found between income and social participation (Komter/ 
Vollebergh 2002). Nevertheless, we consider this approach to social participation to 
be the rock bottom of the crowding out approach. 
Family and friendship bonds function as a safeguard against economic hardship. 
States, however, may have come to substitute the function of this economic safety 
net by providing social security – not as charity, but as an individual right. Thereby, 
these states crowd out the role of family and friends: people no longer need to 
depend on their social network, but rather on the state, and therefore have less 
(material) incentives for social participation. Vice versa, states that lack such exten-
sive social security systems induce them to social participation.  
We expect that the inverse relationship between the state level social security 
and social participation is stronger for people with a low income than for people 
with a high income.  
– H1a The lower the level of social security in welfare states, the higher the level 
of social participation.  
– H1b There is a stronger effect of social security on social participation for the 
economically weak than for the economically strong – i.e. for the poor than for 
the rich. 
Hypotheses: Socio-Economic Security  
Maslow (1970) would not consider the need of socio-economic security to be a goal 
of social participation, but rather a precondition. The more citizens feel economi-
cally secure, the more they will look for ways to obtain a sense of belonging through 
social participation. Therefore, the higher the level of social participation.  
States may contribute to meet the lower needs by providing social security as an 
economic safety net for citizens. They satisfy citizens’ needs for economic security, 
and indirectly reinforce social participation. Contrary to the crowding out thesis, the 
socio-economic security thesis proposes a positive relationship with social security. Again 
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we expect the impact of social security on social participation to be stronger for the 
economically weak than for the economically strong.  
– H2a The higher the level of social security in welfare states, the higher the level 
of social participation.  
– H2b There is a stronger effect of social security on social participation for the 
economically weak than for the economically strong – i.e. for the poor than for 
the rich. 
National income also may have a positive effect on the economic safety of citizens. 
Economic development at the national level raises the resources in a society 
(Halman 2003) and has a positive impact on pro-social attitudes (Van Oorschot/ 
Arts 2005). Therefore, we expect countries with high levels of economic develop-
ment to show high levels of social participation.  
– H3a The higher the national level of economic development, the higher the 
level of social participation. 
– H3b There is a stronger positive effect of economic development on social 
participation for the economically weak than for the economically strong – i.e. 
for the poor than for the rich. 
Hypotheses: Safe Refuge  
According to the third line of reasoning, social participation in the intimate sphere 
may be a safe refuge from a (distrusted) public space where public and private goals 
are difficult or impossible to reach (Eliasoph 1998). Social participation is both an 
end in itself (Lin’s expressive benefit) as well as a means to an end (Lin’s instrumen-
tal benefit). Individuals who can more easily pursue their goals in the public sphere 
are less likely to participate in the intimate sphere (Hochschild 1997). When it is 
more difficult to pursue these goals in the public sphere, individuals are more likely 
to seek a safe refuge and socially participate in the intimate sphere.  
The safe refuge thesis claims that the more the institutional setting makes indivi-
duals feel insecure about reaching their goals in the public sphere, the more they use 
relatively secure intimate ties. Citizens feel more insecure in the public sphere to the 
extent that their civic autonomy comes under threat. To cope with insecurity and 
distrust, citizens then revert to social participation (Rose 1994). We propose some 
institutional settings that we consider to determine social participation.  
First, social participation may be affected by the extent to which states enforce 
civil rights. Civil rights are a warrant for undisturbed access to the public sphere. 
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However, when states choose not to enforce these civil rights, we expect citizens to 
revert to social participation. This effect may be stronger for people with a low 
income than for people with a high income: financial means provide citizens with 
more autonomy to manoeuvre.  
– H4a The weaker a state effectuates protection of civil rights, the higher the level 
of social participation.  
– H4b The effect of civil rights on social participation is stronger for the 
economically weak than for the economically strong.  
Second, corruption in the state bureaucracy hampers the freedom and impartiality 
of the public sphere (Transparency International 2000). People who think of the 
public sphere as corrupt and politicized will opt to participate in informal networks 
instead of in the broader public sphere (Eliasoph 1998). Family ties can be used to 
contact officials and find entrance to state arrangements (Mars/Altman 1992). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
– H5 The more the state is (perceived to be) corrupt, the higher the level of 
social participation. 
Third, in liberal democracies civic autonomy is protected rather strongly by the 
state. In young democracies, however, civil society has to emerge, and political life 
needs to stabilize before the public sphere functions as well and is perceived to be safe 
(Rose 1994). Therefore, we expect social participation to be high in new demo-
cracies compared to longstanding democracies:  
– H6 The younger the democratic regime of a country, the higher the level of 
social participation. 
Data and Measurements 
While testing these hypotheses, we control for individual level determinants that 
were found significant in previous research. We distinguish an individual level (level 
1) and a state level (level 2). The individual level data were derived from the first 
wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002. These questions were asked in all 
countries that participated in the ESS 2002 (ESS 2002: 17) Western European coun-
tries, 4 former communist countries, and Israel. We split the German sample into 
the former West- and East-Germany. Luxembourg was left out of the analysis, as it 
is an outlier on several of the independent variables.  
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Dependent variables 
We distinguished between two measures of social participation in the ESS data set. 
We treated them as measures of the frequency and content of social participation in 
the broad, informal network. 
The quantity of social participation (or ›associational solidarity‹) was operationalized 
by the question how often respondents meet socially with friends, relatives or 
colleagues. Answers range from 1 (never) to 7 (daily). The quality of social participation 
(or ›functional solidarity‹) was operationalized as the extent to which respondents 
provide help to others, outside of work and voluntary organisations. It ranges from 
1 (never) to 7 (daily).  
Independent national level determinants 
We used IMF-statistics on social security, which we standardized as a percentage of 
the GDP. As a measure of economic development we used GNI/Capita PPP, the 
national income per head of the population corrected for differences in price levels, 
again based on IMF data. Both measures correlate strongly with statistics from 
other sources (e.g. World Bank, OECD and Eurostat). The length of democratic rule 
(Inglehart 1997) indicates how long a country has been democratic without disrup-
tion (topping off in 1920). Protection of civil rights is based on the annual index from 
the Freedom House: countries are ranked on a scale that ranges from 1 (no civil 
liberties) to 7 (high level of enforced civil liberties). By absence of a measure of cor-
ruption, we used a measure of perceived corruption, namely the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) 2002, issued by Transparency International. The CPI is based on 
multiple surveys in which experts were asked to rate countries’ levels of corruption 
from 0 (no corruption) to 10 (highly corrupt).  
Independent individual level determinants 
For education we used a cross-national measure on the level of education that ranges 
from 1 (›not completed primary (compulsory) education‹) to 7 (›second stage of 
tertiary education (leading directly to an advanced research qualification)‹). Income 
was measured as the actual amount of money available to the household (i.e. net 
income), categorized into 12 groups (with 1 being the lowest income). For income 
source we distinguished between those who get money from salaries or profit (as the 
reference group) and those who do not: the pensioned, the unemployed, those who 
depend on other social benefits and those who depend on other sources of income.  
We used both age and age-squared in the equations, as previous studies showed 
topping off effects for age. Length of residence in a community is measured in years. 
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Level of urbanization ranges from rural to urbanized. Sex has males as the reference 
group. In the survey respondents were asked to report whether they are citizen of the 
country they live in. Our measure of marital status distinguished between those who 
are married (the reference group) and the divorced, the separated, the widowed and 
those who never have married (yet). Household size was measured as the number of 
people living in a household. We also know whether respondents have or have had 
children living in their household. 
For religious denomination we took the non-religious as our reference group, to 
which we compare the Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox and people from other 
religions. Religious attendance was measured by a quasi-metric scale ranging from 
never to daily.  
For media consumption we included separate measures of the amount of time 
people claim to spend listening to the radio, reading a newspaper and watching 
television. Lack of health was operationalized by the subjective report of respondents 
of his or her health. We knew to which extent respondents feel unsafe in the 
neighbourhoods they live in. Lack of social trust was measured by the single question 
whether most people can be trusted, or that you can not be too careful in dealing 
with people. Lack of happiness was operationalized by the respondent’s claim to what 
extent he or she is happy taking all things into consideration. A final constraint was 
lack of income satisfaction: the extent to which respondents find it difficult to live on 
the current household income. 
Analyses 
As social participation is a function of both individual level and contextual level 
predictors we employ multi-level analysis (hierarchical modelling) (Snijders/Bosker 
1999) using the ML-WIN 2.0 package. Respondents with one or more missing 
values on any of the variables were left out of the analyses; subsequent models are 
all based on the same set of respondents.  
First, we will briefly describe the cross-national differences in the diverse modes 
of social participation, presented in the figures below. 
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Figures 1a–1b: Modes of social participation by country 
  
 
Meet socially with friends, relatives, colleagues  
 
0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
5 0 
6 0 
7 0 
8 0 
9 0 
1 0 0 
 
Help people outside work/volunary organisations 
 
0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
5 0 
6 0 
7 0 
8 0 
9 0 
1 0 0 
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We find large country level differences on both modes. The frequency of meeting 
socially with friends, relatives and colleagues is circa 80% in Norway and Denmark, 
which is nearly twice as high as in Poland, Greece and Hungary. Generally, the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe score relatively low, including former 
East Germany. As for provision of help, the German-speaking countries are all at 
the high end of the spectrum of providing help, whereas the Latin Rim countries 
are all at the low end. 
Variance analyses show that these country level differences are significant. We 
found significant variances at both levels for all modes of social participation (see 
Table 1).  
 
 Frequency of 
social meetings  
Providing help  
 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
5.0 
1.6 
3.8 
1.8 
N 26860 26860 
Baseline model 
   s2u0j 
   s2e0ij 
   Intraclasscorrelation 
   -2LL 
 
0.227 
2.193 
0.093 
97415.48 
 
0.246 
3.026 
0.075 
106064.30 
Composition model 
   s2u0j 
   s2e0ij 
   Intraclasscorrelation 
   -2LL 
   Deviance  
   Df 
   Significance 
 
0.200 
2.014 
0.090 
95133.93 
2281.55 
23 
>0.001 
 
0.254 
2.930 
0.080 
105197.50 
866.80 
23 
>0.001 
Full model (model A) 
   s2u0j 
   s2e0ij 
   Intraclasscorrelation 
   -2LL 
   Deviance 
   Df 
   Significance 
 
0.078 
1.955 
0.038 
94317.09 
796.17 
14 
>0.001 
 
0.124 
2.904 
0.041 
104940.40 
242.90 
14 
>0.001 
Full model including cross-level interactions (model B) 
   s2u0j 
   s2e0ij 
   Intraclasscorrelation 
   -2LL 
   Deviance 
   Df 
   Significance 
 
 
0.074 
1.954 
0.038 
94304.74 
12.35 
3 
0.006 
 
 
0.124 
2.902 
0.041 
104921.10 
19.30 
3 
>0.001 
 
Table 1: Variance analyses 
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In both the baseline and the composition model the individual and country level 
variances were significant. To ascertain whether multi-level analysis is not merely 
appropriate but also sensible, we looked at the intraclass-correlation. In the compo-
sition models respectively 9 and 8 percent of the variance was at the contextual 
level. This percentage is sufficiently high to look for contextual level determinants 
in a multi-level model.  
Results 
Tables 2 and 3 provide insights in the direct and the interaction effects of the 
individual and contextual level determinants on the frequency of social contacts and 
on providing help. 
 
 Table 2 Table 3 
 Frequency of social meetings Providing help 
 Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B 
Individual level predictors 
  Level of education  
  Income 
  Source of income 
(profit/salary) 
  · pensioned 
  · unemployed 
  · other social benefit 
  · other 
  Age 
  Age-squared (* 100) 
  Length of residence (* 10) 
  Urbanization 
  Sex (man) 
  · woman 
  Marital status (married) 
  · divorced 
  · separated 
  · widowed 
  · unmarried 
  Household size 
  Children at home 
  Religion (none) 
  · Catholic 
  · Protestant 
  · Orthodox 
  · Other 
 Attendance of religious 
services 
 Citizen of country of 
residence 
 
0.01 (0.01) 
0.01 (0.01) 
 
0.10 (0.03) 
0.08 (0.06) 
0.25 (0.05) 
0.41 (0.08) 
-0.05 (0.00) 
0.03 (0.00) 
0.03 (0.01) 
0.03 (0.01) 
 
0.02 (0.02) 
 
0.28 (0.04) 
0.28 (0.07) 
0.37 (0.04) 
0.24 (0.03) 
-0.03 (0.01) 
-0.12 (0.03) 
 
0.03 (0.03) 
-0.01 (0.03) 
0.08 (0.10) 
0.01 (0.04) 
0.02 (0.01) 
0.06 (0.05) 
-0.09 (0.01) 
-0.02 (0.00) 
-0.00 (0.01) 
 
0.01 (0.01) 
0.22 (0.06) 
 
0.10 (0.03) 
0.08 (0.06) 
0.26 (0.05) 
0.40 (0.08) 
-0.05 (0.00) 
0.03 (0.00) 
0.03 (0.01) 
0.03 (0.01) 
 
0.02 (0.02) 
 
0.28 (0.04) 
0.28 (0.07) 
0.37 (0.04) 
0.24 (0.03) 
-0.03 (0.01) 
-0.12 (0.03) 
 
0.03 (0.03) 
-0.01 (0.03) 
0.08 (0.10) 
0.01 (0.04) 
0.02 (0.01) 
0.06 (0.05) 
-0.09 (0.01) 
-0.02 (0.00) 
0.00 (0.00) 
 
0.02 (0.01) 
0.00 (0.01) 
 
0.07 (0.04) 
0.14 (0.08) 
0.16 (0.06) 
0.12 (0.09) 
0.05 (0.00) 
-0.06 (0.00) 
0.03 (0.01) 
0.03 (0.01) 
 
0.12 (0.02) 
 
0.18 (0.04) 
0.06 (0.09) 
0.06 (0.04) 
0.07 (0.03) 
0.02 (0.01) 
-0.04 (0.03) 
 
-0.15 (0.03) 
-0.08 (0.03) 
0.13 (0.12) 
-0.09 (0.05) 
0.15 (0.01) 
0.14 (0.07) 
-0.03 (0.01) 
-0.00 (0.00) 
-0.05 (0.01) 
 
0.02 (0.01) 
0.09 (0.07) 
 
0.08 (0.04) 
0.14 (0.08) 
0.15 (0.06) 
0.10 (0.09) 
0.05 (0.00) 
-0.06 (0.00) 
0.03 (0.01) 
0.03 (0.01) 
 
0.12 (0.02) 
 
0.18 (0.04) 
0.06 (0.09) 
0.06 (0.04) 
0.07 (0.04) 
0.02 (0.01) 
-0.04 (0.03) 
 
-0.15 (0.03) 
-0.08 (0.03) 
0.12 (0.12) 
-0.09 (0.06) 
0.15 (0.01) 
0.13 (0.07) 
-0.03 (0.01) 
-0.00 (0.00) 
-0.06 (0.01) 
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  Lack of health 
  Lack of social trust 
  Time spent on watching tv 
  Time spent on watching 
politics 
  Time spent on listening to 
radio 
  Time spent on reading 
paper 
  Lack of income satisfaction  
  Lack of happiness 
  Lack of feeling safe in 
neighbourhood  
-0.00 (0.01) 
0.01 (0.00) 
0.05 (0.01) 
-0.03 (0.01) 
-0.09 (0.00) 
-0.09 (0.01) 
-0.00 (0.01) 
0.01 (0.00) 
0.05 (0.01) 
-0.02 (0.01) 
-0.09 (0.00) 
-0.09 (0.01) 
0.04 (0.01) 
0.02 (0.00) 
-0.07 (0.01) 
0.02 (0.02) 
-0.03 (0.01) 
-0.06 (0.01) 
0.04 (0.01) 
0.02 (0.00) 
-0.07 (0.01) 
0.03 (0.02) 
-0.03 (0.01) 
-0.06 (0.02) 
State level predictors 
  Social security expenditure 
  GPD/capita PPP (* 1000) 
  Years of democracy 
  Civil rights 
  Corruption 
 
-2.57 (1.71) 
0.01 (0.01) 
0.00 (0.00) 
0.15 (0.15) 
-0.07 (0.06) 
 
-2.17 (1.85) 
0.00 (0.02) 
0.00 (0.00) 
0.32 (0.16) 
-0.06 (0.06) 
 
0.74 (2.16) 
0.06 (0.03) 
-0.01 (0.00) 
-0.10 (0.19) 
-0.17 (0.08) 
 
1.26 (2.37) 
0.08 (0.03) 
-0.01 (0.00) 
-0.14 (0.20) 
-0.17 (0.08) 
Cross-level interactions 
  Social security * Income 
  GDP/Capita PPP * Income 
  Civil Rights * Income 
  
-0.05 (0.12) 
0.00 (0.00) 
-0.03 (0.01) 
  
-0.12 (0.15)  
-0.00 (0.00) 
0.01 (0.01) 
a Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level. 
 
Table 2. Meet socially: linear hierarchical regression and Table 3. Help others: linear hierarchical 
regression: Linear hierarchical regression a 
Country level effects 
We are most interested in the direct effects of the state institutional determinants in 
Table 2 and 3. Although models B offer most information, we will go through the 
models from the least to the most elaborate. First we focus on the overall effects in 
models A, that we nuance and specify below in our description of models B.  
Let us first have a look at the effects of social security expenditure on which we 
formulated contradictory hypotheses (1a versus 2a). We find that the effects of so-
cial security expenditures are not significant for both the quantity (meeting) and the 
quality (helping) of social participation, consequently refuting both hypotheses, the 
crowding out thesis (H1a) as well as the hypothesis on the economic safety (H2a). Yet, 
the effect of social security on meeting reaches significance at the .10 level, 
indicating some yet rather weak evidence in favour of the crowding out hypothesis 
(H1a).  
Economic development is not significantly related to the frequency of meetings, 
but is significantly related to providing help. The higher the state level of economic 
development, the more people provide help to each other in the intimate sphere. 
This supports hypothesis H3a. 
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We find that state level enforcement of civil rights does not significantly determine 
the frequency of social meetings nor the extent of providing help. This refutes 
hypothesis H4a. 
The state level of corruption is a significant determinant of help provision: in 
countries characterized by a high level of corruption, people tend to provide help 
less often. The state level of corruption is a significant determinant of social mee-
tings at the .10-level: in countries characterized by a high level of corruption, people 
tend to have fewer meetings with others. Both findings refute hypothesis H5. Appa-
rently, people in corrupt countries are not only likely to distrust their state, but 
moreover, are also less likely to seek refuge in the intimate sphere, as captured by 
this measure.  
Finally, the age of a democracy is not related to social meetings, but is inversely 
related to providing help. This supports hypothesis H6: people in longstanding 
democracies provide less informal help than newly developed democracies. 
Cross-level interactions 
Building on our previous findings we set out to answer our third research question 
in models B of Table 2 and 3: to what extent is the impact of state institutions 
similar across social categories? Models B of Table 2 and 3 tell us that the effects of 
state institutions on either mode of social participation is not similar across social 
categories. 
The effect of social security expenditure is not stronger for people with a low 
income than for people with a high income: the interaction term is insignificant. 
This refutes both hypothesis H1b and hypothesis H2b.  
We do find, in model C of Table 3, that the interaction effect of state level eco-
nomic development and individual income is significant and negative for providing 
help, supporting hypothesis 3b. In other words, the positive impact of economic 
development at the national level on providing help is stronger for poor people 
than for rich people.  
The interaction effect of state level enforcement of civil rights and individual 
level income is significantly negative for social meetings. This finding implies that 
poor people respond more strongly to the enforcement of civil rights by the state 
than the rich. This supports hypothesis 4b.  
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Summary and Discussion 
This paper studies the impact of a range of state institutions on social participation 
in a broad and informal social network, i.e. the associational and functional aspects 
of social participation. We take up an actor-centered institutionalist approach to 
answer three research questions on state effects. The first is to what extent social 
participation differs cross-nationally. Descriptive analyses show large differences 
between countries in the frequency of informal social meetings and the extent to 
which individuals provide help.  
The second question we set out to answer is to what extent state level insti-
tutions determine these modes of social participation. This study demonstrates that 
some state institutions significantly impact social participation, also when we 
control for other individual level determinants.  
The empirical evidence contained in this paper does not corroborate the crowding 
out thesis. This contribution offers mixed support for the second line of reasoning, 
the socio-economic safety thesis: social security is not, but economic development 
is significantly and positively related to providing help. Finally, we also find some-
what mixed support for the safe refuge thesis. A lack of state level enforcement of 
civil rights does not increase social participation. The length of democratic rule is 
significantly and negatively related to providing help, but not to social meetings. 
Finally, the level of corruption is a strong determinant of social participation, but 
contrary to the safe refuge thesis. State level corruption negatively impacts social 
meetings as well as providing help.  
For our third research question we tested whether the impact of state institu-
tions is the same for the economically weak as for the economically strong. It would 
be wrong to speak of the impact of state institutions on either mode of social parti-
cipation as a single term. Rather, the impact of state institutions on the social par-
ticipation of the poor is stronger than on that of the rich. Civil rights and economic 
development are a significantly stronger determinant for the poor than for the rich.  
The cross-level interaction effects simultaneously show that the effect of indivi-
dual level income on social participation is conditioned by state level characteristics. 
From this perspective, this association is significantly less strong in societies with 
more economic prosperity at the national level, and in societies where civil rights 
are more strongly protected. Especially in non-comparative analyses it would there-
fore be improper to look at the association between income and social participation, 
without taking the conditioning role of state institutions into account. 
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